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Pragmatist Perspectives on Valuation: An Introduction 
 
Michael Hutter and David Stark 
 
A guest takes a sip of wine, and puckers his lips as he puts the glass back down. An art expert 
claims in court that a recently discovered oil painting was not by Leonardo da Vinci. An 
international board of accountants suggests entering assets at their market value in the balance 
sheets of companies. All three cases involve acts of valuation. The wine taster, amateur or 
professional, signals the discovery of a surprisingly good wine, connoisseurs perform as 
arbiters of attribution to the work of a famous painter, and auditors have discretion in deciding 
which technique of estimating the present value of a firm’s assets will be applied. All three 
cases involve uncertainty: something new is entering the world, and someone, or some group 
in society has to determine its worth, its dangers, and its potential. The new vintage has its 
distinct taste; the attribution of the discovered painting to Leonardo’s hand remains 
speculative; the estimation of an asset’s “fair value” accounts for unforeseen changes of worth 
since its acquisition.  
 
Is there comparability in these cases of valuation? And if so, what do we discover about the 
failure and the success of innovations?  
 
As modern society transforms itself into a society of continuous self-change, the scope for 
innovation widens to all processes that introduce something new. A very broad definition of 
innovation is needed to capture cases as diverse as the shapes of specific synthesizer sounds 
to new labor market policies, or from a new fashionable style of painting to the invention of a 
mathematical proof. New products, styles and practices come to be selected and positioned as 
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valuable in communities, organizations and markets. This process is by no means trivial. In 
order to enter a social world of meaning, the unknown item must be recognized as new 
(Hutter et al. 2010). The quality of newness moves into the focus of research: How is it that 
an established understanding of that which is common can be interrupted by something, 
which then is recognized and evaluated as new by some group of arbiters? The challenge is to 
understand in greater detail the dynamics of social innovation, in their trajectories from 
situations of initial dissonance to the moments of valuation during which the new is 
confronted with the value scales of the established world.  
 
In the social sciences, valuation made its first major appearance through John Dewey who 
demonstrated that value is a quality that has to be performed. The concrete action and practice 
of art criticism, for example, is a form of valuation (Dewey 1934: 309–25). Both artists and 
beholders are able to abstract that which is significant (Dewey 1934: 54; see also Muniesa 
2011). He generalized these insights in later works (Dewey 1939, 1943). Since then, 
systematic studies have developed in very diverse empirical fields. For example, policy 
makers and institutions in the field of education seek measures with which to evaluate 
performance in teaching and research, and in the financial sector, objective performance 
indicators are complemented by judgments of future performance. Results have been 
published in a number of recent volumes (Beckert and Aspers 2011; Beckert and Musselin 
2013). As more studies proliferate, a “sociology of valuation and evaluation” has been 
declared (Lamont 2012) and a journal has been launched (Muniesa and Helgesson 2013; 
Vatin 2013).  
 
Valuation has also become a central topic in economic sociology and in economics. There is 
inevitable uncertainty about the performance of products in markets for singularities, like 
restaurant food or novels. A broad range of devices and institutional regimes exists to help 
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consumers make judgments about unknown qualities (Karpik 2010). Pure numerical price 
evaluation is an exceptional situation. In most other cases, the valorization through judgments 
of others provides the necessary information and reduces the risk of disappointing purchases 
(Hutter and Throsby 2008; Callon and Muniesa 2005; Fourcade 2011).  
 
This volume opens a wide spectrum of social change for observation, ranging from 
microscopic change through the appearance of new entertainment goods to macroscopic 
change through new technologies. The authors seek out situations that bring an entire episode, 
from dissonance to valuation, into focus. They consider moments of valuation, captured in 
sites of dissonance. Implicitly, and in some cases explicitly, they work with a pragmatist 
perspective. 
 
Taste, Test, Contest 
De gustibus non est disputandum. We begin, indisputably, with taste. Then we immediately 
make it disputatious because we challenge the dominant view in cultural sociology that taste 
is something one has. Taste, in that view, is primarily symbolic because it is used for social 
purposes to mark distinction (Bourdieu 1984). By contrast the authors in this volume treat 
taste not as a noun but as a verb. It is something one does. It is a social process, to be sure; but 
if symbolic, it is also emphatically material.  
 
Valuation involves a tasting, a testing. The studies here reject the claim that things just “have” 
some value, that their taste is intrinsic to them, and that tests reveal this natural value. At the 
same time they also deny the claim that the taste of things is something merely “attributed” to 
them, and that tests then do nothing more than reveal this value. We reject the dichotomy 
between natural objects (for which there is nothing to do but exploit the properties of things) 
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and socially constructed objects (for which it is enough to show their arbitrary character as the 
stakes in social games).  
 
We consider that the things to be tested and tasted are not given but made, and they are 
transformed in the very process of testing. Furthermore, tasting them or becoming attached to 
them is not like choosing some gratuitous label to enter a social logic of identity and 
difference; rather, identities are made and transformed by them. The chapters in this volume 
treat people’s relationship with things as reciprocal interactions: making things and making 
us. As Antoine Hennion writes in his chapter: “So conceived, both operations (tasting and 
testing) are productive, open, and they remain tightly connected, referring less to an absolute 
divide between objectivity and subjectivity than to a continuous co-production of stabilization 
and transformation, both in the things and in our capacity to feel what they do.” (Hennion in 
this volume). 
 
To the two verbs—to taste and to test—we now add another: to contest. The adage de 
gustibus non est disputandum is misleading, for in matters of taste there can be disputes. 
Taste, whether the noun is understood as the quality of a thing or as the quality of a person, 
can be put to tests. And these tests are themselves contested. As the chapters here detail, the 
trials of valuation frequently involve disputes among different measures of worth, orthogonal 
principles of evaluation, and contending tests of value.  
 
Situations—Situated Critical Moments 
If our first steps were to consider value as a verb and, hence, valuation as a contested process, 
our next steps are to consider the contexts in which valuation occurs. Valuation, as Dewey 
explained takes place in situations (Muniesa 2011). The situations of valuation are felt by the 
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participants, and they are recognizable to observers. Rejecting a methodological individualism 
and a methodological institutionalism, we adopt a methodological situationalism (Suchman 
2007; Latour and Woolgar 1986; Esser 1996; Knorr-Cetina 1981; Stark 2009: 31–33 and 
185). Valuation is spatially and temporally localized. The authors of the chapters in this book 
are attentive to valuation taking place at a given site in a given moment.  
 
The sites of valuation are often spatially marked: the dining hall, the court room, and spaces 
for professional meetings all have their material characteristics. They are sites for collective 
gatherings. Each one is equipped with certain technologies and devices. Valuation sites in 
which creators work are typically studios—for artists, architects, or musicians—or 
laboratories for scientists. These sites are carefully arranged and equipped with tools and 
materials that might be needed for experimentation and production. Sites for consumers are 
either private homes, or spaces that are equipped for a favorable experience, as is the case in 
concert halls, theaters, cinemas and art galleries, or in luxury stores. Sites of valuation can 
also be marked through communication media platforms, from print magazines to TV 
channels and websites. 
 
Moments of valuation are also temporally marked. In most of the cases studies they have a 
recognizable beginning and end. They are identified as sessions, or trials, or experiments. 
They could consist of a sequence of meetings or of an era of changing evaluation standards, 
only recognized in hindsight. The duration of such moments might last for minutes, for hours, 
for months or even for several years. Unavoidably, the recognition of longer moments is 
fuzzier, both among participants and among observers. But it is still possible to observe the 
temporal extension and the internal timing of valuations. 
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Situations are characterized by the particular social assemblage of persons and things that is in 
place and in motion during a span of time. We prefer the language of situation over setting for 
two reasons. First, the authors of the cases in this volume tend to be attentive to how the 
situation is set up, indeed how it might be a setup, that is, increasing the applicability of some 
tests and precluding or posing obstacles to others. Second, the term setting is less evocative of 
the possibility of dispute, of things puzzling, of “Uh-oh, we have a situation on our hands 
here.” Situations of valuation need not necessarily be troubling (and the more powerfully and 
gracefully they are set up, the less troubling they will seem to the participants). But they are, 
at least potentially, sites and moments of dispute and contention.  
 
Newness Spans Dissonance and Valuation 
In contemporary society innovation, for technological objects as well as for organizational 
routines, has become the norm of entrepreneurial strategy. Audiences in the public sphere, in 
entertainment, as well as in the sciences, expect the continuous emergence of new ideas, 
projects and products. As cycles of variation accelerate, there must be procedures in place to 
determine whether the phenomena that disturb the present order are a mistake or an 
opportunity. Newness—the property of belonging to the set of items that find attention—is 
not inherent in a phenomenon. It is designated in situations that are, in hindsight, called 
“creative,” but whose outcome had been highly uncertain (Hutter 2011).  
 
Ask anyone to say what comes to mind when they think of the moment of creativity. Chances 
are that they will, at some point, mention a flash of inspiration when it clicked and they just 
got it. It’s that “a-ha!” moment. The chapters in this book depart from that way of thinking in 
two respects. First, as social scientists, we think about creativity along less individualistic 
lines. For us, creativity is the property or outcome of some collectivity. In that sense, we are 
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more interested in something like a collective “a-ha!” But that is not enough. The second 
differentiation characterizing our approach is that we are actually interested in the moments 
just before and after the “a-ha.”  
 
The chapters in this volume suggest that these moments are often characterized by 
dissonance. To grasp the notion of dissonance and its relevance for innovation we need to 
think more about what is actually happening in that “a-ha.” One might use the word 
recognition to refer to such an experience: “It just came to me, and all of a sudden I 
recognized the new problem.” But a simple understanding of recognition could be misleading 
here. For the more one recognizes an already existing pattern, the less new it is. Innovations 
disrupt old patterns and existing categories. Even when they take an already recognized 
pattern and adopt it (usually with modification) to a new category of problem, they are still 
breaking with old patterns of thought. For this reason, we think about innovation as a process 
of re-cognizing an aspect of the world (Stark 2009).  
 
Recall now a recent “a-ha” moment and then think about the moment just before it. That was 
not likely to have been a settled moment, things were not all worked out. In fact, you might 
have experienced it as puzzled, or scrambled, perhaps even troubled. Although the process we 
are considering is not something in the mind of an individual, the analogy is helpful because 
dissonance refers to a similar process—one taking place in social situations. A situation is 
dissonant when there is more than one framework for assessing it, more than one value 
system for measuring worth.  
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The tension between two value systems can be intense.1 The sovereignty of interpretation is 
contested. In the majority of cases, traditional values prevail: the new idea, proposal or 
product is overlooked or rejected. The moment in which the unknown item finds re-cognition 
as being new is often connected with expressions of surprise. The shift is experienced as a 
jump, as a losing of ground before finding new bearings.  
 
Dissonance disrupts. It decreases the likelihood that things will flow on a smooth course 
towards conformity. For us, collaboration for creativity is not via the standard sociological 
account of shared understandings. Creativity is not smooth. It does not require that everything 
fit neatly together. The social settings for innovation are characterized by differences being 
held in tension (Stark 2009).  
 
Dissonance is a musical metaphor. Some sound or sound constellation violates the aesthetic 
expectations of the listeners. Within the musical field, it connotes a temporary state of 
misunderstanding. This state ends in one of three ways: the dissonant sound is resolved back 
into the old resonant order, the dissonance persists, unrecognized, as a form of noise, or the 
aesthetic expectations adjust to a new resolution. The new resolution may be the result of 
initial intentions by the producers or the outcome of a misunderstanding that has found a 
successful interpretation—in either case, it becomes part of social change. 
 
Newness, the hallmark of innovation, is a fleeting quality: since when and for how long is 
something called “new?” Its fleetingness makes newness difficult to observe. Using our 
distinctions, we can take this temporal instability into account. In order to become something 
                                                
1  The sociological literature offers various models of a society with differing value systems, notably 
worlds of worth (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006), functional subsystems (Luhmann 2013) and 
institutional logics (Friedland and Alford 1991). 
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new, for a while, a variegated process of social interaction takes place: the deviant, the 
tenuous, the rough, is recognized in specific situations, and it is estimated in the terms of 
established value scales.  
 
The distinctions provide a heuristic for empirical investigation. Since newness spans 
dissonance and valuation in situations, the general pattern of comparison will rely on these 
dimensions: the terms of value attributed, the controversies and interpretations expressed, and 
the sites on which the historical, inevitably singular events took place, and continue to take 
place.  
 
Kinds of Moments 
This general pattern helps to organize the contributions from authors who were intentionally 
chosen to represent a variety of sub-disciplines and national backgrounds in the social 
sciences. Although the authors in this volume share an interest in social valuation, their 
chapters are positioned in diverse literatures. They are anthropologists, economic or cultural 
sociologists, organization researchers, historians or political scientists. The differences 
between their empirical evidence reflect the wide variety of appearances that innovation, or 
social change, might take. Four groups of chapters, characterized by similarities in their 
research objects, are distinguished. 
 
A first section gathers varieties of aesthetic valuation. Aesthetic judgments are a particularly 
rich case because of the constant stream of novelties clamoring for the attention of their 
respective audiences. Aesthetic impressions impact on the human senses, they trigger mental 
experiences. The sensations fade with length and repetition, and are therefore replaced by new 
impressions. Trevor Pinch follows a rather long-term change in the sound material used in 
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contemporary music: the genesis of a few successful synthesizer sounds, from their accidental 
invention to pre-fabricated sounds for the Mini-Moog took several decades. The sites were 
music sessions, fairs and concerts. The dissonances were literally frictions of sound. The 
valuation by musicians exposed to the (not yet new) sounds, began with precise formulations 
of what it is that they recognized in the new acoustic signal, and it continued with the 
construction of keyboard-synthesizers.  
 
Antoine Hennion observes equally minute expressions in a food sector where a new vintage 
has to be appraised every year. The sites are ubiquitous—dinner gatherings all over the world 
in which the wine being drunk is given social attention. The dissonance experienced in this 
case is even more physical than sounds: it comes with the sensual taste of a sip, from a 
specialized glass, in a symbolically charged social context. The contest of taste—as an 
acquired skill, social as well as individual, valorizing as well as evaluative—is carefully 
dissected by Hennion. Michael Hutter is interested in the effect of artistically valuable visual 
forms on successful entertainment products. His sites are the studios of artists, film-makers 
and photographers, where documented artistic inventions inspired or prefigured the symbolic 
content of some creative industries products with unusually high margins of profit, and the 
show-rooms, cinemas and magazines in which the products were received by their users or, 
rather, interpreters. Neither authoring nor interpreting are smooth processes, they are both 
driven and even motivated by the appearance of dissonances and gaps of understanding that 
are small enough to be overcome, and to be enjoyed.  
 
In John Brewer’s court case, the site and the situation are particularly explicit. Brewer uses 
the evidence generated during a trial to explore a major shift in the U.S. practice of appointing 
expert witnesses. By provoking the case of a painting falsely attributed to Leonardo da Vinci, 
the art dealer and expert, Joseph Duveen, expected the opinion of art connoisseurs to be 
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recognized and respected in legal proceedings. But connoisseur judgments lost out to 
scientific evidence based on material properties, and were henceforth discredited as a device 
in legal contests. The story told by Svetlana Kharchenkova and Olav Velthuis deals with the 
current contemporary art scene, where personal judgments of art experts still carry authority. 
The sites are art galleries, auction houses, and art fairs in China and Europe, the valuations 
concern two new styles of painting introduced by a few Chinese artists. The styles are named 
‘Cynical Realism’ and ‘Political Pop,’ and a protracted debate has erupted around the claim 
that the name reflects a misunderstanding by Western art protagonists of those painting in 
their original Chinese context. It is this misunderstanding, the authors argue, which fuelled the 
success of the new styles in the foreign setting. Their moment of valuation, then, took much 
longer than the short, intense event of the Duveen case reported by Brewer. 
 
The second section assembles devices valorizing uncertain aesthetic experiences. The 
chapters still address products for aesthetic experiences, aimed at various senses. The focus is 
on particular practices or institutions of valuation that have developed in order to channel 
attention to specific new products. A classic version of such practices is the literary review. 
Phillipa Chong is interested in a specific aspect of review writing. Her sites are the literary 
magazines where a moderately sized number of book authors and reviewers keep switching 
roles. Her interviews demonstrate how the critics’ evaluative practices carry consequences not 
only for the books they review, but also for the evaluators themselves. Given the switch-role 
structure of the contemporary fiction market, she reveals how critics’ social position in the 
field shapes what they put in their reviews: the social interdependencies that result from these 
entanglements between peers. A more recent genre is restaurant reviews, a subset of which is 
examined by Sophie Mützel. The sites are again magazines, this time entertainment 
magazines in Berlin, during the years from 1995 to 2012. The new products to be critiqued 
are restaurant performances. The texts have no literary ambition; they are intended to inform 
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and to attract. As she investigates these texts with topic modeling software, Mützel finds 
trajectories of taste, reflected in the rise and decline of specific food cultures within the city’s 
culinary field.  
 
Anne-Sophie Trébuchet-Breitwiller’s sites are unique and they are meticulously designed. 
With ethnographic methods she enters the stores of a highly successful “alternative” perfume 
maker. The dissonance lies in the ruptures of traditional perfume-making practices, but also—
and here is the focus—on the surprises encountered by a prospective buyer who enters the 
carefully scripted interaction with sales personnel and samples from the “edition” of perfumes 
offered. Valorization, in this business, has been developed into a creative skill. 
 
The cases presented in the other sections of the book are less immediate in their sensory 
appeal. They demonstrate that the innovation pattern of situated dissonances and valuations 
works as well in an expanded social universe. The third section collects studies on valuation 
in fields of practice. Claude Rosental’s field is artificial intelligence and one of its sub-
disciplines called fuzzy logic. The sites are scholarly journals, conferences and a newsgroup 
on the Internet, the moment of valuation started with a paper containing a mathematical proof 
that fuzzy logic can be reduced to binary logic. As the debate on the validity of the deviant 
claim developed, the contributions, conveniently assembled on the website, became ever more 
reflective of the valuation process itself. The valorizing nature of the contributions to a 
scientific and cultural dispute was partially recognized. About a year after the original 
challenge, a set of texts by renowned researchers in artificial intelligence, issued in a reputed 
journal, positioned the argument in a wider context, thus deflecting it. The moment ended, the 
debate ran out of steam.  
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Andrea Mennicken and Michael Power observe the field of financial accounting practice. 
They identify four moments during which unsuccessful and successful attempts were made to 
change fundamental features of that practice. Just as other valuations, accounting is a 
constrained way of producing fictions. The fictions, in turn, react to misinterpretations of 
monetary asset values in increasingly volatile markets. The sites in this chapter are highly 
dispersed. The dissonance in the historical situations erupted whenever new rule 
interpretations by accountants were challenged by a regulatory agency.  
 
Liliana Doganova and Peter Karnøe investigate attempts to improve valuation procedures in 
the agricultural field. The sites are Danish livestock farms and the conflict is triggered 
through the environmental damage caused by slurry. Under the pressure of environmentalists 
and EU norms, state agencies promote more efficient technologies, and encourage farmers to 
invest in the necessary equipment. The Danish agency has developed a tableau of quantifiable 
indicators that aids farmers in determining their “optimal” choice. As in the accounting case, 
the impulse to innovate is not part of the professional regime under study. It is a “boundary 
conflict,” a change in the surrounding economy or the political field that forces farmers into 
choices that are new and highly uncertain for them.  
 
Holger Strassheim, Arlena Jung and Rebecca-Lea Korinek also deal with valuative discourses 
in public policy. Their sites are labor market and food safety agencies in Great Britain and in 
Germany. While studying changes in expert cultures, they discovered the spectacular rise of 
behavioral interventions, so-called “nudging practices.” Their comparative approach revealed 
that experimental evidence and concomitant assumptions on human behavior easily entered 
the British policy regime, but have received considerably less attention in German agencies. 
The reason, they argue, lies in different ways knowledge claims are validated and valued: 
Britain’s communitarian culture of expertise is more open to the publicly demonstrable 
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evidence, whereas expert credibility in Germany draws on institutional affiliation as 
testimony of sound judgment.  
 
The fourth section contains studies of valuation within organizations. These processes are 
particularly difficult to research because they take place in private sites. Organizations, be 
they for-profit or not-for-profit, have little interest in revealing how they deal with their own 
creative procedures and with their techniques while introducing innovations from outside. The 
studies, therefore, rely on the intensive engagement of researchers in the respective 
organizations, and they are in themselves innovative in detecting and expressing moments of 
valuation. Ignacio Farías spent several months in the studios of internationally successful 
architectural firms. Here, newness means the recognition of a proposed project by an external 
jury. In the studios, sets of projects are developed simultaneously, and the team members 
serve each other as judges of quality. They do so in fluid sequences of interaction, without the 
need for formal review meetings. Their routine even has the reflective quality of changing its 
own criteria, if that seems opportune.  
 
Ariane Berthoin Antal has studied organizations in the private as well as the public sector that 
invest in bringing people, practices and products from the world of the arts together in the 
hopes of stimulating a “creative clash” from which new skills or ideas might emerge. These 
artistic interventions occur in clearly defined sites—projects, art installations, workshops—
which she characterizes as interspaces in which the artists temporarily challenge or suspend 
the dominant organizational norms while experimenting with new approaches. As her 
interviews and surveys show, the artists engage with the emotional and physical responses of 
employees as resources for, rather than as barriers to, generating newness. The management 
consultancy company in which Kimberly Chong was a participant observer for 16 months 
follows an entirely different approach in shaping the valuation frame of their employees. 
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Added shareholder value, in terms of reduced cost or increased revenue, constitutes the core 
of the comprehensive systems of accountability that the consultants sell to clients. The 
company applies the same valuation frame to itself. Internal workshops are the sites where the 
components of the system are conveyed. Participants who misunderstand are corrected, and 
old Chinese traditions are invoked to strengthen the persuasion.  
 
* * * 
So, we now invite you to a tasting. The menu in our table of contents has 15 courses. We have 
asked our chefs to keep the portions small. No single essay will be filling in itself, but we are 
confident that the ensemble will be satisfying. It is, of course, a testing, too—an opportunity 
for you to test pragmatist perspectives on the study of valuation. And we expect that there will 
be dissonance—dissonance in departures from currently prevailing ideas as well as 
dissonance in contestation among the positions argued by our authors. We hope these 
dissonances will lead to innovation. Whether and how they are recognized is up to you. 
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